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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of 
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased 
Applicant and Petitioner, 
vs. 
SAMUEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT, CO. ] 
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ] 
FUND OF UTAH, I 
Defendants and Respondants ) 
) BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
1 Case No.: 960398-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (2)(a) (1992) 35-1-82.53 (2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), and 63-46b-14 (1993). This is an appeal from a final 
order wherein the Utah State Industrial Commission reversed the 
ALJ's decision and ignored the plain and clear language of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b), which mandates that the employer serve 
written notice upon the insurance carrier and the Industrial 
Commission if compensation coverage is not desired for an officer 
or director of a corporation. Until written notice is served upon 
both, then the officer or director is considered an employee. The 
Commission found that when the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
(the Fund) , had sent its weekly computer tape to the Industrial 
1 
Commission, that tape satisfied the statutory requirement of 
service of written notice by the employer. A Petition for Review 
was timely filed on June 12, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the Industrial Commission exceed its authority when 
it denied applicant and her three minor children death benefits 
when the Commission disregarded the clear language of Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-43 (3) (b), which requires the employer to give written 
notice to both the Industrial Commission and the insurance carrier 
and the defendant employer did not do this? 
Must defendants pay the decedent's widow and three minor 
children benefits because the defendant employer did not comply 
with Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b)? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b) (1990) is dispositive of 
this appeal. Also, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (1990) is applicable in 
this case. No other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
apply. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gregory James Olsen ("Olsen") was a director or officer 
of Samuel Mclntyre Investments on or about June 3, 1994. (R. 41) 
He was also an employee on that date. (R. 41) Olsen was acting 
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his 
2 
death. (R. 41) In March of 1993, the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah (the Fund) received written notice from the employer that Mr. 
Olsen (a corporate officer) was to be excluded from coverage. (R. 
41) The employer paid no further premiums for Mr. Olsen. (R. 41) 
The employer did not give written notice to the Industrial 
Commission that Mr. Olsen was to be excluded from coverage as 
required by statute. (R. 30, 41) 
Without a hearing, because the parties stipulated to the 
facts, the ALJ ordered defendants to pay death benefits. (R. 45) 
Defendants filed a Motion for Review. (R. 53) On June 10, 1996, 
the Industrial Commission reversed the ALJ's order. (R. 108) 
Petitioner then timely filed this Petition. (R. Ill) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gregory James Olsen ("Olsen") was a director or officer 
of Samuel Mclntyre Investments on or about June 3, 1994. (R. 41) 
He was also an employee on that date. (R. 41) Olsen was acting 
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his 
death. (R. 41) In March of 1993, the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah (the Fund) received written notice from the employer that Mr. 
Olsen (a corporate officer) was to be excluded from coverage. (R. 
41) The employer paid no further premiums for Mr. Olsen. (R. 41) 
The employer did not give written notice to the Industrial 
Commission that Mr. Olsen was to be excluded from coverage. (R. 
30, 41) On March 30, 1994, the Workers Compensation Fund made a 
computer entry memorializing the exclusion. (R. 41) The Fund sent 
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the weekly computer tape to the Industrial Commission. (R. 41) 
Said tape contains changes in policy information including updated 
exclusions cr coverage. (R. 41) The Fund has collected premiums 
retroactively when the Fund has discovered that a large group of 
employees was not covered by the employer but should have been. 
(R. 42) However, this has only been done on rare occasions and on 
a large scale basis. (R. 42) 
On July 30, 1994 the employer sent to the Fund a 
"Employer's First Report of Injury or Illness." (R. 001) The Fund 
denied benefits to the widow and three minor children of Olsen, 
claiming that the decedent chose not to have coverage. (R. 002) 
After the widow filed an Application for Hearing, the parties 
stipulated to the facts and the ALJ had the parties brief the issue 
of whether there was coverage or not. (R. 003, 021) The ALJ found 
that the employer had not sent written notice to the Industrial 
Commission as required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43 (3) (b) , (R. 45) 
which states: 
A corporation may elect not to include 
any director or officer of the corporation as 
an employee under this chapter. If a 
corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve written notice upon its insurance 
carrier and upon the commission naming the 
persons to be excluded from coverage. A 
director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee under this chapter 
until this notice has been given. (R. 41) 
The ALJ ordered the employer's insurance carrier to pay death 
benefits to the widow and three minor children because the employer 
had not complied with the statute. (R. 45) 
The Fund filed a Motion for Review and the Industrial 
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Commission granted the Motion in a split decision (2-1) on June 10, 
1996. (R. 53, 108) The majority of the Industrial Commission 
found that the weekly computer tape sent by the Fund to the 
Industrial Commission somehow satisfied Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43 (3) (b). (R. 108) Commissioner Carlson, in his dissent, stated 
that the statute requires the employer to give written notice to 
both the Industrial Commission and the insurance carrier. (R. 
108-9) Commissioner Carlson also stated that the Industrial 
Commission "has no authority to disregard the statute's clear 
language. Furthermore, the provisions of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act are to be liberally construed in favor of 
coverage." (R. 109) On June 12, 1996 petitioner timely filed a 
Petition for Review with this Court. (R. Ill) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission exceeded its authority when it 
reversed the ALJ's decision and ignored the plain and clear 
language of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3) (b) , which mandates that the 
employer send written notice to the insurance carrier and the 
Industrial Commission if compensation coverage is not desired for 
an officer or director of the corporation. Until written notice 
was received by both, then the officer or director is considered an 
employee. The Commission erroneously found that the Fund had sent 
a computer tape to the Industrial Commission and that tape somehow 
satisfied the statutory requirement of written notice from the 
employer. 
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ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
The issue on appeal is a question of law. In considering 
a question of law, the reviewing Court affords no deference to the 
Industrial Commission's legal conclusions. Rather, this Court 
employs a correction-of-error standard. Hurley v. Industrial 
Commission, 767 P. 2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988) . This court must "review 
an agency's interpretation and application of statutes for 
correctness, unless the statute in question grants the agency 
discretion." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). This Court must closely 
scrutinize the Commission's order to determine whether the 
appropriate legal principles were applied when the Commission 
failed to award applicant death benefits. 
POINT I 
DID THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEED 
ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT DENIED APPLICANT 
AND HER THREE MINOR CHILDREN DEATH 
BENEFITS WHEN THE COMMISSION 
DISREGARDED THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. §35-1-43(3) (b) , WHICH 
REQUIRES THE EMPLOYER TO GIVE WRITTEN 
NOTICE TO BOTH THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION AND THE INSURANCE CARRIER 
AND THE DEFENDANT EMPLOYER DID NOT DO 
THIS? 
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3) (b) \ states: 
A corporation may elect not to include 
any director or officer of the corporation as 
an employee under this chapter. If a 
corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve written notice upon its insurance 
carrier and upon the commission naming the 
persons to be excluded from coverage. A 
director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee under this chapter 
until this notice has been given. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. If the corporation does not "serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier and upon the commission", then the director or 
officer is considered an employee. In the case at hand, the 
employer gave the Fund notice, but it is undisputed that the 
employer did not give written notice to the Industrial Commission 
as required by the statute. The ALJ found that the employer had 
not sent written notice to the Industrial Commission and ordered 
the employer's insurance carrier to pay the death benefits to the 
widow and three minor children. 
The Fund filed a motion for review and the Industrial 
Commission granted the motion in a split 2-1 vote. The majority of 
the Commission found that when the Fund supplied the Industrial 
Commission with a magnetic computer tape, which contains changes in 
policy information including updated exclusions of coverage for all 
of the Funds' policies, the statute had been satisfied. The 
Commission's decision is reversable for two reasons: first, the 
employer did not serve the Commission notice; and, second, the 
Since the death of Mr. Olsen, the legislature has changed Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-43(3) (b) to now only require that written notice be given to the insurance 
company. 
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magnetic computer tape that contains all of the information of all 
of the Fund's numerous policies is not notice and it certainly is 
not written notice as required. Because the Industrial Commission 
erroneously interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b) this Court 
must "review statutory interpretations by agencies for correctness, 
giving no deference to the agency's interpretation, unless the 
statute grants to the agency the discretion to interpret the 
statute." Ferro v. Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 
App. 1992) (citing Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
581, 588 (Utah 1991)) . Furthermore, the statute does not grant the 
Industrial Commission discretion to interpret the statute. 
As shown above, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3) (b) states an 
employer may elect to exclude officers or directors; however, if 
this election is made, the employer shall serve written notice to 
both the insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission. The law 
is well settled that the effect of the use of the term "may" 
signifies permission and generally means that the action spoken of 
is optional or discretionary and not mandatory or required. 
McMaster v. Mcllroy Bank, 654 S.W. 2d 591, 594 (Ark.App. 1983); 
State Exrail Cartwright v. Okl. Natural Gas, 640 P.2d 1341, 1345 
(Okl. 1982); State v. Wilson, 264 S.E.2d 414 (So.Car. 1980). 
The ordinary and usual meaning of "may" is one of 
permission, discretion or option and not of requirement. The word 
"may" when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term 
rather than demandatory connotation of the word "shall". In Herr 
v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974), the Utah 
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Supreme Court cited Anderson v. Yunakau, 329 U.S. 482 (1946), which 
states: 
The word "shall" is ordinarily "language of 
command." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493, 
55 S.Ct. 818, 819, 79 L.Ed. 1566. And when 
the same Rule uses both "may" and "shall", the 
normal inference is that each is used in its 
usual sense--the one act being permissive, the 
other mandatory. 
Herr, 525 P.2d at 728. 
The controlling statute in the case at hand uses both 
"may" and "shall." As shown above, it states, "[a] corporation may 
elect not to include any director or officer of the corporation as 
an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes this 
election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier 
and upon the commission." That means written notice by the 
employer to the Industrial Commission is mandatory. This Court, in 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), 
stated: 
Utah courts construing statutes containing 
the term "shall" generally have concluded that 
term is mandatory. . . . (term "shall" in 
statute is usually presumed mandatory rather 
than discretionary). (Cites omitted). 
Id. at 559. Because the employer did not give written notice then 
Mr. Olsen was considered an employee and should have workers' 
compensation coverage. This is consistent with Utah law. This 
Court stated: 
When faced with a question of statutory 
construction, we first examine the plain 
language of the statute. . . . We will resort 
to other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if we determine that the language is 
ambiguous. . . . Thus, when statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, we will not 
look beyond the same to divine legislative 
intent.... Additionally, we must assume 
"that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." . 
(Cites omitted and emphasis added). 
Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 79-80 (Utah App. 1994) . The 
Industrial Commission did not determine that the statute is 
ambiguous, unreasonably confused, or inoperable. The defendants 
did not raise this defense below either. In fact, the statute is 
very clear and unambiguous. Mr. Olsen is considered an employee 
until both the Fund and the Industrial Commission received written 
notice from the employer informing them otherwise. 
The Commission's decision that the statute does not 
require separate notice (R. 107) flies in the face of the plain and 
clear language of the statute. Moreover, the Commission ignores 
the affidavit of its own employee, Karla Winkler, which states, 
"According to our files & [sic] to the best of my knowledge the 
Industrial Commission has not received a corporation exclusion form 
on Samuel Mcintyre [sic] Investments." Ms. Winkler's affidavit 
clearly shows that the Commission had not been served written 
notice. The Fund did not provide any evidence from the Industrial 
Commission that the Commission received the exclusion on the tape. 
Commissioner Carlson accurately observed that the 
Commission "has no authority to disregard the statute's clear 
language. Furthermore, the provisions of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act are to be liberally construed in favor of 
10 
coverage." Consequently, the Industrial Commission committed 
reversible error when it misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3) (b) and denied applicant and her three minor children death 
benefits and this Court should reverse the Commission's order and 
reinstate the ALJ's order. 
POINT II 
MUST DEFENDANTS PAY THE DECEDENT'S 
WIDOW AND THREE MINOR CHILDREN 
BENEFITS BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT 
EMPLOYER DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE 
ANN- §35-1-43(3) (b) ? 
The Industrial Commission's decision that the Fund's 
computer tape satisfies Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3)(b) was really a 
pretext to deny benefits because the Commission felt it was unfair 
that, "Mr. Olsen, as president and signator for Mclntyre, intended 
and understood that his workers' compensation coverage was 
terminated." That may have been Mr. Olsen's intent; however, until 
the statute was fully complied with, Mr. Olsen could not change his 
status as an employee and could not terminate coverage. (See, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-45) . Consequently, his widow and three children 
are entitled to death benefits. 
In Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 
1990), this Court stated, "The Industrial Commission is not free to 
'legislate' in areas apparently overlooked by our lawmakers or to 
exercise power not expressly or impliedly granted to it by the 
legislature, even in the name of fairness." Id. at 578 (emphasis 
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added). By following the clear and unambiguous language of other 
statutes, Utah courts have acknowledged harsh, and sometimes 
inequitable, results can occur. In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. 
of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 883 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "the Act allows an at-fault employer to escape 
liability altogether at the expense of the injured employee. We 
agree with plaintiff that this result is inequitable, but the 
effect of the statutory language is clear." Id. at 883 (footnote 
omitted) . The same Court reiterated "'where statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, ' we will 'not look beyond the same to divine 
legislative intent.'" Id. (Cite omitted). The Court then stated, 
"[w]e are not free 'to assess the wisdom of a statutory scheme.'" 
Id. Moreover, the law in Utah is very clear, "it is for the 
judiciary to assume that each term of a statute was advisedly 
adopted by the Legislature." Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth. 618 P.2d 
480, 481 (Utah 1980). In the present case, the Commission may not 
like the result; however, the language of the statute is clear, 
plain and unambiguous. Therefore, the decedent was considered an 
employee at the time of his death and his family is entitled to 
death benefits. 
In Hacker v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona, 758 
P.2d 662, 157 Ariz. 391 (Ariz. App. 1988) the Arizona Court was 
faced with a case where the statute required the employee to give 
written notice to the employer and the insurance carrier that 
coverage was waived. Hacker was the owner of the corporation which 
made him both employer and employee. He was killed in the : . _;rse 
12 
and scope of his employment. However, his wife had sent a letter 
to the insurance company requesting termination of his benefits. 
Yet, after his death, the wife applied for benefits because the 
decedent had not written himself a letter notifying himself that he 
waived coverage. The insurance company denied benefits and argued 
that it would be "ludicrous" for Hacker to write himself a letter. 
Id. at 663-5. 
However the Arizona court rejected this argument and 
awarded benefits. The reasons were as follows: First, "statutory 
formality serves a purpose separate from that of actual notice." 
Id. at 665. It also "reinforces the importance of the election of 
remedies." Such a requirement may "help to protect the claimant 
'against his own improvidence or folly.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
"Second, the requirement of formal notice is no different than the 
corporate directors elect themselves officers or that corporate 
officers authorize the payment of salaries to themselves. It is 
simply a consequence of the corporate form of doing business." Id. 
The carrier also claimed that such a ruling would create 
a "loophole" and a miscarriage of justice. The Arizona court 
stated, "[t]o some extent, this is true. However, both the carrier 
and the independent broker involved in this case were in the 
insurance business. As a result they should have known the 
requirements for a legally effective rejection of workers' 
compensation coverage by an employee." Id. 
In the present case, to overturn the Industrial 
Commission's order is not unjust either. The Fund is the state's 
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largest workers' compensation insurer and "should have known the 
requirements for a legally effective rejection of workers' 
compensation coverage by an employee." Jd. In order to protect 
itself, the Fund could have continued to charge a premium on the 
corporate officers or directors until the employer provided proof 
that written notice was given to the Industrial Commission. 
Furthermore, the Fund is not without a remedy. The Fund 
admits that it has collected premiums from employers after it 
learned that a large group of employees was not covered by the 
employer but should have been2. The Fund even admitted to the 
Industrial Commission that as many as 26,500 employers may not have 
complied with §35-1-43(3) (b) . 26,500 appears to be a large group 
of employees that are not covered but should have been. This gives 
the Fund an alternative remedy. Therefore, this Court should 
overturn the Industrial Commission's Order and reinstate the ALJ's 
order, which orders defendant to pay applicant death benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the language of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3) (b) is very clear and unambiguous. Officers and directors are 
considered employees until the employer serves written notice upon 
2 
This is not a new or unusual position. In Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 
(Utah 1981) the employer moved the court to allow it to amend its answer to include 
the defense that the injured plaintiff was an employee and the plaintiff's 
exclusive remedy was with the Industrial Commission. The employer also told the 
Court that coverage could be obtained for plaintiff and eight other individuals 
"simply by paying the previously unpaid premiums." Id. at 96. 
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the carrier and the Industrial Commission. This is a mandatory 
requirement. The Fund stipulated that the Industrial Commission 
did not receive notice from the employer. Because the language of 
this statute is plain and unambiguous, the Industrial Commission 
committed reversible error when it looked beyond the same to divine 
legislative intent. Therefore, this Court should overturn the 
Industrial Commission's Order and reinstate the ALJ's order, which 
orders defendant to pay applicant death benefits. 
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EUGENE C. MILLER, JR. 
Attorney for Appellees' 
1458\brief.app 
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ADDENDUM A 
ative" defined — Mining lessees and sublessees 
— Partners and sole proprietors — Corporate of-
ficers and directors — Real estate agents and 
brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "oper-
ative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the 
service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district 
under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer and employee of the 
state institutions of learning and members of the National Guard while 
on state active duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 
35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not including any per-
son whose employment' is casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, 
any lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, 
and shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same 
extent as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid 
employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the 
proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance pre-
mium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an em-
ployee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes this 
election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the commission naming the persons to be covered. No partner of a part-
nership or owner of a sole proprietorship is considered an employee under 
this chapter until this notice has been given. For premium rate making, 
the insurance carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the employee to 
be 150% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the 
corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A 
director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this 
chapter until this notice has been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "oper-
ative" do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in 
Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for a real estate broker 
if: 
(n) HubHtnntially all of tho real CHLUIC a u n t ' s or associated broker's 
income for services is from real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are per-
formed under a written contract specifying tha t the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states tha t the real estate agent or associated broker is 
not to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "oper-
ative" do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 
64-13-19, except as required by federal s tatute or regulation. 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid-
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the^depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed by accident « ^ ~ * c ^ ^ 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No, 95-182 
JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of, 
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SAMUEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY/WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
RECEIVED 
NOV 2 01995 
w
'
rk?£222*»fta 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
3, 1995 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was 
cancelled at the request of the parties. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was represented by Eugene Miller, 
Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Janet Moffitt, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for death benefits for the widow 
and 3 minor children of Gregory J. Olsen, deceased, who died in an 
automobile/train accident, while in the course of his employment, 
on June 3, 1994. The carrier denies the claim for death benefits, 
because the corporate employer notified the carrier in March of 
1993 that it chose to exclude Gregory Olsen from coverage. As a 
result, the carrier discontinued collecting a premium for coverage 
of Olsen. Olsen was a coporate officer or director of the 
corporate employer and U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b) allows optional 
exclusion for corporate officers and directors. The applicant 
argues that the corporate employer gave inadequate notice in order 
to accomplish exclusion of Olsen as an employee of the corporate 
employer and thus, per U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b), Olsen must be 
considered an employee of the corporation on the date of his death, 
with his widow and children still entitled to benefits. 
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The attorneys notified the ALJ, prior to the hearing date, 
that the sole issue for resolution in this case was a legal one and 
that there were no factual disputes. Therefore, the attorneys 
requested that they be allowed to file a fact stipulation and 
written argument, in lieu of a hearing, to present the issue to be 
decided. The ALJ agreed to allow for this manner of adjudication. 
The fact stipulation and applicant's memorandum were received at 
the Commission on August 23, 1995 and the defendants' responsive 
meorandum was received at the Commission on September 20, 1995. 
The matter was considered ready for decision on September 20, 1995. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The undisputed facts in this matter are as follows, verbatim 
from the applicant's memorandum: 
1. Gregory James Olsen (Olsen) was a director 
or officer of Samuel Mclntyre Investments on 
or about June 3, 1994. He was also an 
employee on that date. 
2. Olsen was acting within the course and scope 
of his employment at the time of his death. 
3. In March of 1993, the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah (the Fund) received written 
notice from the employer that Mr. Olsen (a 
corporate officer) was to be excluded from 
coverage. The employer paid no further 
premiums for Mr. Olsen. 
4. The employer did not give written notice to 
the Industrial Commission that Mr. Olsen was 
te be excluded from coverage. (Exhibit A, 
Affidavit from Karla Winkler). 
5* On March 30, 1994, the Workers Compesation 
Fund made a computer entry memorializing the 
exclusion. The Fund sent the weekly 
computer tape to the Industrial Commission. 
Said tape contains changes in policy 
information including updated exclusions of 
coverage. 
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6. The Fund has collected premiums 
retroactively when the Fund has discovered 
that a large group of employees was not 
covered by the employer but should have 
been. However, this has been done on rare 
occasions and on a large scale basis. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED: 
Both parties agree that the applicable statutory provision 
is U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b), which reads as follows: 
A corporation may elect not to include any director 
or officer of the coporation as an employee under 
this chapter. If a corporation makes this 
election, it shall serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier and upon the commission naming 
the persons to be excluded from coverage. A 
director or officer of a corporation is considered 
an employee under this chapter until this notice 
has been given. 
The applicant argues that the plain language of the last 
sentence of this provision indicates that, if written notice is not 
provided to both the insurance carrier and the Industrial 
Commission, by the corporation, there is no exclusion and the non-
excluded directors and officers are considered employees for 
workers compensation purposes. The applicant argues that, in the 
instant case, although the carrier was notified in writing of the 
intended exclusion, the Commission was not, and therefore Olsen 
must be considered an employee as of the date of his death. With 
respect to the carrier's failure to collect a premium in this case, 
the applicant argues that this is the carrier's error and the 
carrier should have continued to collect a premimum on Olsen until 
such time as it was clear that the corporation had notified the 
Commission of the exclusion. In addition, as a means of remedying 
the failure to collect a premium after March of 1993, the applicant 
argues that the carrier can simply charge the corporation a f,back 
premium" for coverage of Olsen for the period from March 1993 to 
the date of Olsen's death. 
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Counsel for the applicant cites the Arizona case of Hacker 
v. Industrial Commission of Arizona. 758 P.2d 662 (Ariz. App. 1988) 
as on point. Counsel argues that in Arizona there is a statute 
that requires the employee to give notice to the employer if an 
exclusion is desired. In Hacker, apparently the spouse of the 
employee gave notice to the insurance carrier that exclusion was 
requested. Per counsel for the applicant, the court found this to 
be insufficient notice and found that there was a purpose behind 
requiring the exact format of notice that the statute required, 
even if it resulted in requiring a corporate officer to basically 
write himself a letter giving notice of his desire to be Excluded. 
Counsel for the defendants argues that the corporate 
decision to drop coverage on corporate officers/directors in this 
case most cerrainly involved Olsen's input, considering he was a 
corporate officer/director. Counsel argues that it is 
inappropriate to allow corporate officers/directors to profit from 
their own non-compliance with the statute. Counsel argues that 
this occurs when corporate officers/directors are allowed to decide 
to exclude themselves, thereby saving the cost of a premium, and 
then are allowed to recover on a claim for benefits after the 
desired exclusion, because the corporation failed to do as the 
statute requires (i.e. notify the Commission in writing). Counsel 
argues that this is an especially inappropriate result when notice 
to the Commission serves no purpose. Counsel indicates that the 
legislature has recognized that no purpose is served by requiring 
notification and has eliminated the requirement for Commission 
notice as of the most recent amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b). 
Finally, counsel argues that the Commission did receive actual 
notice of the exclusion in this case, because the Commission 
received the carrier's computer tape which contained the exclusion 
information. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ has reread section U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b) many times 
over in order to determine whether or not there is any ambiguity in 
the language of the statute. In the final analysis, the ALJ finds 
that there is no ambiguity and that the last sentence clearly 
requires that the corporation itself must give written notice to 
both the carrier and the Industrial Commission before an exclusion 
is accomplished. Receipt of notice is not a requirement in the 
statute and thus the matter of the computer tape received by the 
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Commission would seem to be irrelevant. The ALJ finds that, in the 
instant case, it is clear that written notice was not given to the 
Commission by the corporation, as the statute requires. As such, 
per the literal language of U.C.A. 35-1-43(3)(b), Olsen was not 
excluded as an employee and must still be considered an employee of 
the corporation at the time of his death. As a result, the widow 
and the children are due death benefits. 
Having stated the ultimate ruling in this matter, the ALJ 
feels compelled to explain that she finds the unambiguous language 
of U.C.A; 35-1-43(3) (b) to require an act on the part of corporate 
employers (giving notice to the Commission) that has no apparent 
underlying purpose. In addition, as noted by counsel for the 
defendants, the language of this section allows for corporate 
officers/directors to simply fail to comply with the apparently 
purposeless notice and thereby profit as a result. The ALJ cannot 
believe this result was intended by the legislature. The ALJ 
should state that she has no information that would confirm that, 
in the instant case, Olsen was involved in any intentional attempt 
to profit by non-compliance with the statutorily required notice. 
It is a possibility, but certainly nothing in the stipulated facts 
of this case suggests a corporate attempt to defraud the carrier. 
Nonetheless, the ALJ is bothered by the potential for abuse that 
the statutory language allows. Unfortunately, the ALJ cannot 
ivalidate the legislation simply because she finds it 
objectionable. Perhaps the legislature was aware of the potential 
for abuse when the statute was amended recently. At least the 
current reading of the statute does not allow for corporate abuse. 
The ALJ should also note that she has rendered het decision 
in this matter simply based on what she considers to be unambiguous 
language in the statute and not based on the applicants arguments 
with respect to the Hacker case or his arguments regarding 
potential remedies available to the carrier. The ALJ finds the 
Hacker rationale is not exactly on point and it is unclear whether 
the carrier remedy suggested by the applicant is actually available 
to the carrier in this particular case. In Arizona, the statute 
apparently requires notice by the actual employee to be excluded 
(as opposed to by the corporation) to the employer (as opposed to 
to the Commission). In Hacker the employee's spouse notified the 
carrier of the exclusion request. This is clearly a long way from 
the requirement that the employee notify the employer. In the 
instant case, compliance with notification was much closer to what 
the statute requires and thus it is less clear that the intended 
exclusion should be nullified. In addition, apparently, the court 
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in Hacker found that there was some purpose to having the employee 
do the notification, because it provided evidence of an actual 
election of remedies made by the individual who would be entitled 
to the benefits. As noted above, the Utah statutory requirement of 
notice to the Commission by the corporation does not have any 
apparent underlying purpose. Therefore, it is unclear why non-
compliance with the requirement should result in a finding of no-
exclsuion-accomplished. But once again, the ALJ cannot invalidate 
the legislation simply because it does not serve any apparent 
logical purpose. 
Apparently, because the parties wanted the threshold issue 
of coverage resolved first, the ALJ has not been provided with 
facts relative to the issue of the appropriate compensation rate. 
As such, the ALJ will not make an actual accounting of benefits due 
in this order. If the applicant is desirous of having an actual 
award made in a Supplemental Order, the applicant's attorney should 
petition for such and provide the ALJ with a suggested rate that 
the defendants can respond to. Otherwise, the ALJ will presume 
that the parties will settle the issue of the actual accounting of 
benefits due. In the following order, the ALJ will simply note 
that death benefits are found due and owing. This conclusion is 
based on resolution of the sole legal issue presented to the ALJ in 
favor of the applicant. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Samunel 
Mclntyre Investment Company/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, pay 
the applicant, Judean Olsen, widow, and her three minor children, 
death benefits, as a result of the death of her husband, Gregory J. 
Olsen, in the course of his employment with Samuel Mclntyre 
Investment Company on June 3, 1994. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this /& day of November, 1995, 
J^L 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on November /(? 1995, a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of 
Judean S. Olsen, Widow of Gregory J. Olsen, Deceased, was mailed to 
the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Judean Olsen 
101 Grason Vista Drive 
Queenston, UT 21658 
Eugene Miller, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State, Suite 340 
SLC, UT 84111-2320 
Janet Moffitt 
Attorney at Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P O Box 57929 
SLC, UT 84157-0929 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
hL 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JUDEAN S. OLSEN, Widow of 
GREGORY J. OLSEN, Deceased, 
Applicant/ 
v. 
SAMUEL MCINTYRE INVESTMENT CO. 
and THE WORKERS7 COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 95-0182 
Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co. ("Mclntyre" hereafter) and the 
Workers' Compensation Fund Of Utah (UWCF") ask The Industrial 
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judgefs award 
of survivors' benefits to Judean S. Olsen, widow of Gregory J. 
Olsen, pursuant to the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did Mclntyre satisfy the requirements of §35-1-43(3) (b). of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act for excluding Mr. Olsen from 
coverage. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The facts of this case are not in dispute. For many years, 
including all times material to this proceeding, Mclntyre purchased 
workers' compensation insurance from WCF. In a letter dated 
January 1, 1992 and signed by Gregory J. Olsen as Mclntyre's 
president, Mclntyre instructed WCF as follows: "Please exclude the 
undersigned, Gregory J. Olsen, an officer and director - of the 
policy holder, from coverage under the policy effective 1 January 
1992 and until further notice." 
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On receipt of the foregoing letter, WCF mailed to Mclntyre, to 
Mr. Olsen's attention, a form entitled "Corporate Officer/Director 
Exclusion Form". In substance, the form explained that pursuant to 
§35-1-43 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, after the form was 
completed, signed and returned to WCF, any corporate officers or 
directors listed thereon would no longer be Mclntyre's "employees" 
for purposes of receiving workers' compensation benefits. On 
February 3, 1992, Mclntyre returned the form, signed by Mr. Olsen 
as president of the company. The form listed Mrw. Olsen as the only 
officer/director which Mclntyre intended to exclude from workers' 
compensation coverage. Based on the foregoing, WCF excluded Mr. 
Olsen from coverage under Mclntyre's workers7 compensation 
insurance policy and reduced Mclntyre's premium accordingly.1 
From February 1992, when Mclntyre excluded Mr. Olsen from 
coverage, until Mr. Olsen's death in 1994, Mclntyre paid no 
premiums for workers' compensation insurance coverage on Mr. Olsen. 
Although Mclntyre did not provide separate notice to the Industrial 
Commission that it had excluded Mr. Olsen from coverage, WCF 
notified the Industrial Commission in the usual and customary 
manner, by means of magnetic tape which was downloaded into the 
Industrial Commission's records. 
On June 3, 1994, Mr. Olsen died in an accident arising out of 
and in the course of his duties for Mclntyre. 
DISCUSSION ANP CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to the 
dependant survivors of employees who have died as a result of 
accidents arising out of and in the course of employment. See Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-45. Corporate officers and directors are generally 
1
 The Industrial Commission notes some unexplained 
inconsistency between the dates which appear on the documents 
submitted by WCF and the dates referred to in WCF's motion for 
review. However, these inconsistencies do not appear significant 
because under either version, Mr. Olsen, on behalf of Mclntyre, 
instructed WCF to exclude Mr. Olsen from workers' compensation 
coverage prior to Mr. Olsen's death. 
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considered "employees" for purposes of the benefits provided by the 
Act. However, §35-1-43 of the Act allows corporations to exclude 
officers and directors from coverage. As of the date of Mr. 
Olsen's death, the requirements for "opting out#/ with respect to 
corporate officers and directors were set forth in §35-1-43(3) (b) 
of the Act as follows: 
A corporation may elect not to include any director or 
officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
chapter. If a corporation makes this election, it shall 
serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the commission naming the person to be excluded from 
coverage. A director or officer of a corporation is 
considered an employee under this chapter until this 
notice has been given. 
Thus, at the time of Mr. Olsen's death, §35-1-43 (3) (b) 
required written notice to both the insurance carrier and the 
Industrial Commission in order to exclude an officer or director 
from coverage. It is clear to the Industrial Commission that Mr. 
Olsen, as the president and signator for Mclntyre, intended and 
understood that his workers' compensation coverage was terminated. 
While §35-1-43(3)(b) requires written notice of exclusion to 
both the insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission, it does 
not require separate notice. In this case, it is undisputed that 
Mclntyre, through Mr. Olson as its president, gave written notice 
of Mr. Olsen's exclusion to WCF, which in turn notified the 
Industrial Commission by means of magnetic tape. As a result, the 
Industrial Commission received the same information regarding 
Mclntyre's exclusion of Mr. Olsen that it would have received if 
Mclntyre had directly notified the Industrial Commission. 
In her decis ion, the ALJ concluded that the exclusion 
provision of §35-1-43(3) (b) requires two .separate and distinct 
written documents to effectuate exclusion. As noted above, the 
Industrial Commission finds no requirement of separate notice. The 
Industrial Commission also concludes that notice to the Industrial 
Commission by means of magnetic tape, when such notice is accurate 
and timely, satisfies §35-1-43 (3) (b)'s requirements. 
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In summary, the Industrial Commission concludes that pursuant 
to §35-1-43(3) (b) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Mclntyre 
excluded Mr. Olsen from coverage under the Act. Consequently, Mr. 
Olsen's survivors are not entitled to the benefits provided by the 
Act. 
Because of the foregoing determination, it is unnecessary for 
the Industrial Commission to consider the other points raised by 
WCF's motion for review. 
QRPEE 
The Industrial Commission reverses the decision of the ALJ and 
grants WCF's motion for review. The Industrial Commission 
concludes that Mr. Olsen was not covered by the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act at the time of his death. Consequently, his 
dependants are not entitled to survivors benefits under the Act. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this /0_day of June, 1996. 
I dissent. Although I may be sympathetic to the position 
chosen by my colleagues, I find the requirements of §35-1-43(3) (b) 
are explicit in their requirement that the employer give notice of 
its election to exclude officers and directors from coverage by 
giving written notice of such election to both the Industrial 
Commission and the insurance carrier. Regardless of the argument 
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advanced by the majority that the written notice of exclusion need 
not be a separate notice, the plain language of the statute simply 
states otherwise. The Industrial Commission has no authority to 
disregard the statute's clear language. Furthermore, the 
provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act are to be 
liberally construed in favor of coverage. Consequently, I would 
conclude, as did the ALJ, that Mclntyre did not meet §3 5-1-
43(3) (b)'s requirements for exclusion of Mr. Olsen. I would 
further conclude that WCF's other arguments are- without merit and 
that Mr. Olsen's widow and dependants are entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits. ~ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by 
the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0 
days of the date of this order. 
• U^Urn^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of Judean S. Olsen, Case No. 95-0182, was 
mailed first class postage prepaid this /Q& day of .Mery", 1996, to 
the following: 
JUDEAN S. OLSEN 
101 GRASON VISTA DRIVE 
QUEENSTONE, MD. 21658 
EUGENE MILLER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
JANET L. MOFFITT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P 0 BOX 57029 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157 
7/^ - -l^L-ki-^ 
Adell 'Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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